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Food fraud results from the interaction of motivated offenders with opportunities, and lack of control
measures. The vulnerability to food fraud varies across chain actors (tiers) though, but insights on prime
fraud drivers and enablers, as well as chain areas where vulnerabilities might exist are lacking. In the
current study the ﬁsh, meat, milk, olive oil, organic bananas, and spice supply chains were assessed for
their fraud vulnerabilities. The differences and similarities in vulnerabilities across the supply chains, as
well as between groups of chain actors were evaluated using the SSAFE food fraud vulnerability
assessment tool. Multiple correspondence analysis and agglomerative hierarchical clustering were
applied for exploratory data analysis, and differences between chains and actors were assessed by
analysis of variance and post-hoc tests. Thirteen fraud factors related to opportunities and motivations
scored high across all supply chains indicating their importance as fraud drivers and enablers. Control
measures varied considerably across supply chains and actor groups, with technical (hard) controls
generally being more in place than managerial (soft) controls. Approximately half of the fraud factors
were impacted by the type of commodity chain, and one out of seven of the fraud factors by the actor
group. From the current sample group overall fraud vulnerability appeared highest for the spice chain,
which was followed by the olive oil, meat, ﬁsh, milk and organic banana chains. Among the actor groups,
the wholesale/traders group appeared most vulnerable, followed by retailers and processors. The current
results provide new insights in the fraud factors determining fraud vulnerability in various supply chains,
and the (dis)similarities in fraud vulnerability across supply chains and actor groups which helps to
combat future food fraud.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Food fraud is a form of criminal behaviour, no matter the deﬁ-
nition of crime. The consequences of food fraud are devastating.
Food companies and their reputation are damaged, stories go viral,
whole supply chains are painted with the same brush, consumer
conﬁdence erodes, markets collapse, and management and/or
employees are ﬁred, prosecuted, and locked up. The general effects
show similarities with other corporate frauds (Kuang & Lee, 2017).
Losses for individual businesses may include social losses &roup, Wageningen University
Netherlands.
Ruth), pieternel.luning@wur.
zheng.yang@wur.nl (Y. Yang),
Ltd. This is an open access article upunishments, third party losses (e.g. extra testing), conﬁdence
losses, sales losses & over payment, as well as recall losses (Bindt,
2016). If we take the horsemeat affair as an example, it certainly
had a huge economic impact: widespread product recalls and
serious effects on all ground beef sales across Europe (Moyer,
DeVries, & Spink, 2017). There is some popular belief that food
fraud is mostly an external threat caused by organized crime groups
seeking to permeate the food supply chain. Although politically
convenient, in reality it is more often a problem within the food
system itself and committed by legitimate food supply chain actors
who make the most of criminal opportunities that arise (Lord,
Flores Elizondo, & Spencer, 2017).
Fraud is the result of the interaction between motivated of-
fenders, and the opportunities presented by victims and by those
entrusted with controlling risks according to Levi (2012). Fraud
vulnerability results from openings for undesirable events resultingnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Chen, & Wu, 2017). Further, criminogenic incentives can differ for
the various tiers in production and distribution chains (Simpson,
2011). An assessment of the factors affecting this vulnerability is,
therefore, the ﬁrst step towards fraud prevention and mitigation.
Food fraud vulnerability is deﬁned by three key elements: oppor-
tunities, motivations, and control measures. These elements can be
subdivided into technical opportunities, opportunities in time and
place, economic drivers, culture and behaviour, technical control
measures, and managerial control measures (van Ruth, Huisman, &
Luning, 2017). A food fraud vulnerability assessment (FFVA) can
identify areas in the food chainwhere vulnerabilities might exist. It
can also determine the key drivers and enablers of the vulnerability
in supply chains (Spink, Moyer, & Whelan, 2016). From the food
fraud vulnerability concept of the three key elements described
above, an FFVA tool was developed (SSAFE, 2017), and was made
available as a free downloadable app (PwC, 2017).
Some commodities seem to be more associated with food fraud
than others. An inventory of reports in the three global food fraud
databases over the period 2008e2013 revealed that the six most
frequently reported commodity groupswere spices and herbs, olive
oil, seafood, dairy products, meat, and other oils and fats
(Weesepoel & van Ruth, 2015). In China, especially animal products
have been surfacing often in media fraud reports in 2004e2014
(Zhang & Xue, 2016) and in the Netherlands the top 3 included
meat, ﬁsh, and organic produce according to an analysis of media
reports over the period 2008e2014 (van Wagenberg, Benninga, &
van Ruth, 2015, p. 126).
The present study deals with fraud vulnerability across supply
chains that have been reported often in the food fraud inventories
since it appears that fraud is occurring in those chains. Fraud vul-
nerabilities in the ﬁsh, meat, milk, olive oil, organic banana, and
spice supply chains were examined in order to understand the
contributions of various fraud factors to the overall fraud vulnera-
bility. Furthermore, we evaluated the differences and similarities
between commodity supply chains, as well as between groups of
actors (tiers) across chains (e.g. processors, retailers). Detailed ex-
aminations of differences within the speciﬁc chains are not
considered for this particular paper. For the spices chain such a
detailed evaluation has already been published previously (Silvis,
van Ruth, van der Fels-Klerx, & Luning, 2017).
2. Materials and methods
2.1. The food supply chain networks and actor groups assessed
Businesses in supply chains of six commodities were assessedTable 1
The three key elements of the food fraud vulnerability assessment and the 50 associated
Key element Fraud factors
Opportunities (1) complexity of adulteration of raw materials; (2) availability techno
materials; (4) availability technology and knowledge to adulterate ﬁn
counterfeiting; (7) detectability of counterfeiting; (8) access to produc
historical evidence of fraud in raw materials; (11) historical evidence
Motivations (12) supply and pricing raw materials; (13) valuable components or a
company; (16) ethical business culture own company; (17) criminal o
strains supplier; (20) economic health supplier; (21) organizational st
supplier; (24) victimization of supplier; (25) corruption level country s
business culture branch of industry; (29) historical evidence branch o
Control
measures
(32) fraudmonitoring system rawmaterials; (33) veriﬁcation of fraudm
veriﬁcation of fraud monitoring system ﬁnal products; (36) informati
integrity screening own employees; (39) ethical code of conduct own
supplier; (42) fraud monitoring system supplier; (43) information sys
network; (46) fraud control industry; (47) national food policy; (48) law
planand compared for their fraud vulnerabilities. They involved (num-
ber of interviewed actors in brackets): ﬁsh (5), meat (5), milk (8),
olive oil (8), organic bananas (8), and spices (8). The actors
belonged to three actor groups: wholesalers (7), processors (22),
and retailers (13). Wholesale included traders, importers, distrib-
utors, and auctions, i.e. all organizations that did not process the
products but just passed them on in the chain. Processors included
companies processing the primary product, such as olive oil, but
also complex food manufacturers. Primary producers, such as
farmers or ﬁshermen were not involved.
2.2. The food fraud vulnerability assessment (FFVA)
Various factors contributing to food fraud have been identiﬁed
and were collated in a practical FFVA (PwC, 2017; SSAFE, 2017). The
assessment consists of 50 questions and associated three level
answering grids (low-medium-high vulnerability). Each question
relates to the previously identiﬁed fraud factors: 9 for opportu-
nities, 20 for motivations, and 21 for control measures (Table 1). The
assessment was developed and tested through an extensive,
interactive and iterative process with representatives from the
global food industry, retail, authorities, and scientiﬁc community
(van Ruth et al., 2017). The assessments in the ﬁsh, milk, meat, olive
oil, and organic banana chains were carried out as described pre-
viously (Silvis et al., 2017). Furthermore, the data of actors from the
spice chain of a previous study were included as well (Silvis et al.,
2017).
2.3. Data analysis
The answers to the questions, selected by the businesses, were
transformed to a score system. For opportunities andmotivations, a
score of 3, 2, and 1 was assigned to high, medium, and low
vulnerability situations, respectively. For control measures the
reversed order was used. The answers/situations associated with
the three vulnerability levels are presented in the FFVA tool for each
fraud factor (PwC, 2017; SSAFE, 2017). The two questions on
counterfeiting, question 6 and 7, were not further considered since
they did not apply to the commodity chains examined. For
exploratory analysis, multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) and
agglomerative hierarchical clustering (AHC) was applied. Oppor-
tunities and motivations related fraud factors were considered
prime drivers and enhancers if their scores exceeded the average
for either the opportunities or motivations group. Furthermore, to
investigate the speciﬁc differences between the supply chains (ﬁsh,
meat, milk, olive oil, organic bananas, spices) and the actor groups
(wholesale, processor, retailer), a multi-factor analysis of variancefraud factors.
logy and knowledge to adulterate raw materials; (3) fraud detectability in raw
al products; (5) fraud detectability in ﬁnal products; (6) complexity of
tion lines/processing activities; (9) transparency in the chain network; (10)
of fraud in ﬁnal products.
ttributes; (14) economic health own company; (15) organizational strategy own
ffences own company; (18) corruption level country own company; (19) ﬁnancial
rategy supplier; (22) ethical business culture supplier; (23) criminal offences
upplier; (26) economic health sector; (27) criminal offences customer; (28) ethical
f industry; (30) level of competition branch of industry; (31) price asymmetries
onitoring system rawmaterials; (34) fraudmonitoring system ﬁnal products; (35)
on system own company; (37) tracking and tracing system own company; (38)
company; (40) whistle blowing own company; (41) contractual requirements
tem supplier; (44) tracking and tracing system supplier; (45) social control chain
enforcement local chain; (49) law enforcement chain network; (50) contingency
Fig. 1. Tiling-like visualisation of the most frequently recorded FFVA scores (modes)
for each fraud factor across six commodity supply chains. Modes associated with high
vulnerability are coloured red, with medium vulnerability orange, and with low
vulnerability green.
S.M. van Ruth et al. / Food Control 84 (2018) 375e381 377(ANOVA; chain x actor) was carried out with subsequent post-hoc
tests (Fisher’s Least Signiﬁcant difference tests: Fisher’s LSD test).
XLstat (Addinsoft, New York, NY, USA) was used for all statistical
analyses and P ¼ 0.05 throughout the study.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Food vulnerability data: general results
Fraud vulnerabilities were assessed in the ﬁsh, meat, milk, olive
oil, organic banana, and spice supply chains consulting the actor
groups wholesalers, processors, and retailers, which resulted in
scores for ﬁfty questions for each business interviewed. Fig.1 shows
the most frequently selected vulnerability levels per question (the
mode), which allows a ﬁrst view of the differences and similarities
across the commodity supply chains. A green box refers to a low
vulnerability mode, orange to a medium vulnerability mode, and
red to high vulnerability mode. It appears that generally scores for
opportunities are higher than scores for motivations, whereas we
notice that control measures vary across commodity supply chains.
Since the motivations questions touch on sensitivities with regard
to a potential offender, they may be answered slightly more
reservedly than the opportunities related questions. Furthermore, a
number of the motivations questions concern the own company,
which may be an even more sensitive topic. This would be in
agreement with the ‘alien conspiracy theory’ which describes that
crime is often perceived as not being part of the own direct envi-
ronment and shaped by the environmental circle itself, but rather a
problem of threatening external parties (Kleemans, 2013). To
circumvent this aspect the statistics applied involve relative
comparisons.
Some general prime fraud drivers and enablers can be distin-
guished by selection of those fraud factors that were assigned
scores above average of the respective opportunities or motivations
group. These 13 factors are: (Q2/4) availability technology and
knowledge to adulterate raw materials/ﬁnal products; (Q3/5) fraud
detectability in raw materials/ﬁnal products; (Q10/11/29) historical
evidence of fraud in raw materials/ﬁnal products/branch of in-
dustry; (Q12) supply and pricing of raw materials; (Q13) valuable
components or attributes of raw materials; (Q25) corruption level
country supplier; (Q26) economic conditions branch of industry;
(Q30) level of competition branch of industry; and (Q31) price
asymmetries. In this group of prime drivers and enablers both
opportunities and motivations related fraud factors are included,
which underlines that both opportunities and motivations need to
be considered. It underpins the fraud vulnerability concept which
considers the elements opportunities, motivations, and (the lack of)
control measures the key ingredients of food fraud. The results are
also conﬁrm statements of Moyer et al. (2017), who concluded that
both macro- and micro-level factors must be considered simulta-
neously to assess fraud vulnerability.
Regarding mitigation of fraud by individual businesses, two
options exist. One can avoid vulnerability by reducing opportu-
nities and motivations, i.e. ceasing or not commencing activity to
remove the source. Alternatively, the vulnerability can be lowered
by implementation of control measures (Manning & Soon, 2016).
The control measures are evaluated slightly different from the
opportunities and motivations since they are not directly drivers
and enablers. However, from the assessment we can determine
which control measures are generally available and thus reduce
vulnerability since a high and medium vulnerability scores reﬂect
adequately and partly implemented control measures. When
looking more in detail into the control measures which counteract
the opportunities and motivations, it appeared that ~70% of all the
businesses interviewed had any form of a fraud monitoring system
S.M. van Ruth et al. / Food Control 84 (2018) 375e381378for raw materials in place, but only ~45% had a similar system for
ﬁnal products. Furthermore, businesses answered that ~75% of
their suppliers had such a monitoring system in place. From the
businesses ~30% and from their suppliers only ~10% had an elabo-
rate fraud monitoring system in place, i.e. a systematic, evidence-
based (using both historical and scientiﬁc data) sampling plan for
fraud-related analyses, speciﬁc fraud screening methods and sys-
tematic use of ﬁt-for-purpose conﬁrmatory techniques (in house or
in collaboration with accredited laboratories), customized proced-
ures for fraud monitoring and handling of non-conformities, and
systematic record keeping and detailed documentation of fraud
monitoring procedures & systems (SSAFE, 2017). Approximately
80% of the businesses had an information (mass balance) system
available, and ~75% of their suppliers. Similarly 85% had a tracking
and tracing system present and 90% of their suppliers. On the
contrary the managerial (soft) controls were not as widely available
as the technical controls. Although ~80% had a code of conduct, only
~50% had a form of employee integrity screening, and ~65% had
whistle blowing facilities. Ninety percent of the interviewed busi-
nesses indicated that there was some form of social fraud control in
the supply chain, but only ~15% reported extensive social control.
Fraud industry guidelines were lacking according to ~50% of the
businesses. Furthermore, 45% and 65% businesses respectively, felt
that the national food policy and enforcement were insufﬁciently
covering fraud. The latter is remarkable since the European Com-
mission (EC) has been addressing food fraud more extensively after
the 2012 illegal horsemeat affair (EP, 2013). It resulted for instance
in modiﬁed legislation and the EU Food Fraud Network of author-
ities sharing information on food fraud. Despite these efforts, many
businesses still perceive food policy and enforcement with regard
to food fraud in its infancy though.3.2. Food vulnerability data: exploring clusters
To explore the data of the individual businesses, all FFVA data
were subjected to MCA, the ﬁrst two dimensions of which are
plotted in Fig. 2. We see a clear grouping of actors in the same
commodity supply chain. The milk and bananas (right hand side)Fig. 2a. First two dimensions of a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) on all FFVA sc
different commodities.chains are separated from the ﬁsh and olive oil chains (left hand
side) in the ﬁrst dimension. The spices and meat chains separate in
the second dimension. The plots show that the general FFVA pat-
terns are very much determined by the type of commodity chain.
The (dis)similarity between the chain actors interviewed was
further examined by AHC (Fig. 3). We can distinguish three main
clusters. One group (blue) shows generally relatively low scores for
opportunities and motivations, and high scores for control mea-
sures. This low vulnerability, blue group mainly consists of ﬁsh
chain and organic banana chain actors. The remainder of the
businesses are clustered in two groups. Both show relatively high
scores for opportunities and motivations related fraud factors.
However, the red group (predominantly meat) shows high scores
for control measures and thus has counteract measures in place,
whereas for the green coloured group (predominantly ﬁsh, olive oil,
spice) generally lower scores for control measures are observed.
The AHC results are in line with the MCA results, which also
showed the commodity chain groupings and associated fraud fac-
tors (Fig. 2: scores and loadings plot). The assignment to the clus-
ters is not fully according to commodity chain though; some
businesses end up in other groups than their chain counterparts.
Obviously, assessment patterns are not only determined by the
commodity supply chain. Therefore, we will examine the impact of
the supply chain and the actor group on individual fraud factors in
greater detail in the following sections.3.3. Differences across commodity chains
The impact of the commodity chain as well as actor groups of
the present study was examined simultaneously using a multi-
factor ANOVA. The results are presented in Table 2, which shows
the 23 fraud factors presenting signiﬁcant differences in scores
across the commodity chains. Four opportunities related fraud
factors (Q8/9/10/11, see Tables 1 and 2), nine motivations related
fraud factors (Q13/18/19/22/23/24/25/27/28), and ten control
measures related fraud factors (Q34/35/36/39/41/42/43/47/48/49)
revealed signiﬁcant differences across the commodity supply
chains. Thus, the scores of about half (46%) of the fraud factorsores: scores plot (upper) and loadings plot (lower). In the upper plot colours indicate
Fig. 2b. In the lower plot high vulnerability scores are coloured red, medium vulnerability scores black, and low vulnerability scores green.
Fig. 3. Dendrogram of the agglomerative hierarchical clustering (AHC) of all FFVA
scores showing the three main clusters in blue, red, and green.
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inﬂuenced by the commodity chain. Meat shows highest scores for
opportunities related fraud factors, such as access to production
lines and historical evidence (Q8/10/11). Meat and olive oil show
highest scores for motivations related questions, such as valuable
components and criminal offences of customers (Q13/27). On the
other hand, the ﬁsh and spice chains show greatest lack of
(adequate) control measures, e.g. for the availability of a fraud
monitoring system for the ﬁnal products and fraud preventing
contractual requirements of suppliers (Q34/41). Taking all of the
above into account, the order in fraud vulnerability from low to
high in the current study is organic banana, milk, ﬁsh, meat, olive
oil, with spice ranking highest. Although the chains were selected
based on their fraud reports, it appears that we can adequatelycharacterize and distinguish them by the fraud factors contributing
to their overall fraud vulnerability. The above is in agreement with
criminological research, which consistently has shown that some
industries are more criminogenic than others and that structural
characteristics are critical factors associated with white-collar
offending (Simpson, 2011).3.4. Differences across actor groups
Using multi-factor ANOVA, the signiﬁcant differences across
actor groups were examined simultaneously with the impact of the
commodity chains (section 3.3), the results of which are presented
in Table 3. Seven fraud factors (i.e. one out of seven) showed
signiﬁcantly different scores between the actor groups: one op-
portunities related fraud factor (chain transparency: Q9), two mo-
tivations related fraud factor (ﬁnancial strains supplier: Q19;
criminal offences customer: Q27), and four control measures
related fraud factors (companies’ information system: Q36; and
ethical code of conduct: Q39; contractual requirement suppliers:
Q41; enforcement local chain: Q48). The latter are managerial
control measures only. All these fraud factors are also affected by
the commodity chain, so there is an effect on these scores by both
the actor group and the commodity chain.
Although the three actor groups: processors, retailers and
wholesalers all three rate high for one of the opportunities/moti-
vations related questions, it is in particular the (lack of) control
measures that demonstrate differences between the groups. The
processors have most or most adequate control measures in place,
followed by the retailers, and eventually the wholesalers group.
From this perspective, the wholesalers (including wholesale,
traders, distributors) are most vulnerable to fraud. Since they are in
the middle of the chain, they are also more likely to pass on the
potential fraud to their customers. In chains with this kind of actors,
and especially with a larger number of them, e.g. such as present in
the spices chain, overall fraud vulnerability is likely to be enhanced.
That fraud vulnerability of actor groups vary is due to the varying
modus operandi and vivendi of different groups in the supply
chains. They have been described extensively for the meat supply
chain in relation to fraud by Manning, Smith, and Soon (2016).
Table 2
Fraud factors of the FFVA demonstrating signiﬁcantly different vulnerability across commodity supply chains.a
Question nr Fraud factor
Org banana 
n=8
Milk        
n=8
Fish            
n=5
Meat          
n=5
Olive oil  
n=8
Spice     
n=8
Opp.        8 Access production lines C C AB A BC C
9 Transparency chain network B B AB B B A
10 Historical evidence raw materials B B B A A B
11 Historical evidence final products D CD AB A B BC
Motiv.     13 Valuable components/attributes B A C A A A
18 Corruption level country own company B B B B B A
19 Financial strains supplier B AB AB B A B
22 Ethical business culture supplier C C AB BC AB AB
23 Criminal offences supplier B B AB A B B
CCBABACBCBreilppus noitazimitciV42
25 Corruption level country supplier A C C BC AB AB
27 Criminal offences customer B B AB A A B
28 Ethical business culture industry C BC AB C A ABC
Controls  34 Fraud monitoring system final products A BC C AB BC C
35 Verification system Q34 A B B A B B
36 Information system own company A AB AB AB B AB
39 Ethical code of conduct own company A AB B AB AB A
41 Contractual requirements supplier B AB B A AB B
42 Fraud monitoring system supplier A AB AB A AB B
43 Information system supplier AB A B AB B C
BBABABBAAycilop doof lanoitaN74
48 Law enforcement local chain A A AB A A B
49 Law enforcement chain network AB BC AB A AB C
Overall vulnerability
a Different capital letters in a row indicate significant differences (Fisher's LSD test, P < 0.05); Higher, intermediate, and lower vulnerability scores are coloured red, 
orange, and green, respectively
Table 3
Fraud factors of the FFVA demonstrating signiﬁcantly different vulnerability across actor groups in supply chains.a
S.M. van Ruth et al. / Food Control 84 (2018) 375e3813804. Conclusions
This study provided insight in prime fraud drivers and enablers,
used counteracting control measures, and the relative fraud vul-
nerabilities of six commodity supply chains and their actors. We
identiﬁed 13 prime fraud drivers and enhablers (opportunities and
motivations related fraud factors) which seem to contribute highly
to the fraud vulnerability of the assessed chain actors. The control
measures vary a lot across supply chains and actor groups. Often
technical control measures (hard controls) are to some extent in
place, but managerial (soft) controls which counteract motivations-
related fraud factors are less extensively present. Managerial con-
trols at the wider environment level, i.e. social control and food
policy and enforcement, are perceived as lacking or insufﬁcient in
many cases.
Fraud vulnerability was shown to be determined by both the
commodity chain and the position of the actor in that chain: ca. half
of the fraud factors were signiﬁcantly impacted by the type of
commodity chain and one out of seven of the fraud factors by the
actor group. Based on differences and similarities between the
chains and actor groups, we demonstrated that the spices chainranked highest in overall fraud vulnerability; subsequently fol-
lowed by olive oil, meat, ﬁsh, milk, and organic banana. The
wholesalers/traders group is considered as most vulnerable among
the actor groups, they were followed by the retailers, and pro-
cessors groups.
The current study provided understanding of the fraud vulner-
ability and associated fraud factors in six supply chains. In future
work, it is of interest to compare data with chains with a relatively
low number of fraud reports and composite food products.
Furthermore, an extension of the individual supply chains exam-
ined would increase insight as well and could involve fraud
vulnerability examinations of primary producers, as well as food
service and catering actors.
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